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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
the order of the Utah Supreme Court dated June 13, 1988, and 
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
granting Respondent Brighton Bank's Motion for Relief from 
Stay of Proceedings under Utah Code Ann., Section 7-2-7 
(1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the lower court err in granting Brighton Bank 
relief from the automatic stay of Section 7-2-7, of the Utah 
Code in order to proceed with its trust deed sale even 
through Brighton Bank's senior lien interest was adequately 
protected by a $65,000 "equity cushion" in the real property 
at issue and in spite of the irreparable harm to Copper 
State's depositors through the extinguishment of Copper 
State's junior lien interest? 
2. Did the lower court err in refusing to provide 
Copper State's depositors with the special protections 
afforded under Section 7-2-7 to depositors of failed thrift 
1 
institutions chartered in Utah, especially in view of the 
express legislative intent to preserve assets of a failed 
thrift in order to maximize the return to depositors? 
3. Did the lower court err in refusing to consider 
federal bankruptcy law in interpreting and applying Section 
7-2-7 in view of the analagous intent of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, the well-developed body of law concerning 
the preservation and liquidation of assets provided by 
federal bankruptcy decisions, and even though the language of 
Section 7-2-7 is virtually identical to the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann,, Section 7-2-7 (1987): 
(1) Except as otherwise specified in Subsection (2), a 
taking of an institution or other person by the Commissioner 
under this Chapter shall operate as a stay of the 
commencement or continuation of: (a) any judicial, 
administrative, or other proceeding against the institution, 
including service of process; (b) the enforcement of any 
judgment against the institution; (c) any act to obtain 
possession of property of or from the institution; (d) any 
act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property 
of the institution; (e) any act to collect, assess, or 
2 
recover a claim against the institution; and (f) the setoff 
of any debt owing to the institution against any claim 
against the institution. Upon application and after notice 
and hearing, the court may, for cause shown, terminate, 
annul, modify, or condition the stay. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 7-1-102, (1987) (set forth in 
relevant part in brief, p. 21-22) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 7-1-301, (1987) (set forth in 
relevant part in brief, p. 22) 
Utah Code Ann., Section 7-20-1, (1987) (set forth in relevant 
part in brief, p. 22-23) 
11 U.S.C., Section 362 (set forth in Addendum, p. A-10) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard 
H. Moffat, granting Respondent Brighton Bank's Motion for 
Relief from Stay of Proceedings under Utah Code Ann. Section 
7-2-7, (1987), thereby allowing Brighton Bank to proceed with 
a non-judicial foreclosure of certain property against which 
Appellant Grant Thornton & Co. (hereinafter "Grant Thornton11) 
as receiver/liquidator of Copper State Thrift & Loan 
(hereinafter "Copper State") holds a junior lien interest. 
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The Third Judicial District Court issued its final Order 
Modifying Stay of Section 7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated on 
March 8, 1988. The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 25, 
1988. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Copper State is the holder of a Promissory Note 
(hereinafter "Copper State Note") executed by Willis and 
Afton Wright (hereinafter "Wrights") on or about March 29, 
1983. The Copper State Note was secured by a Deed of Trust 
(hereinafter "Copper State Trust Deed") executed by Wrights, 
as trustors, in favor of Copper State, as beneficiary, on or 
about March 29, 1983 describing real property located at 2500 
Walker Lane, Salt Lake County, Utah (hereinafter "Property"). 
(Findings of Fact No. 1, Record at 1484.) 
2. On or about September 12, 1983, Wrights executed, as 
trustors, a Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Brighton Note") and 
Trust Deed (hereinafter "Brighton Trust Deed") in favor of 
Brighton Bank describing the Property. (Findings of Fact No. 
2, Record at 1484.) 
3. On or about October 11, 1983, Copper State agreed to 
subordinate the Copper State Trust Deed to the lien of the 
Brighton Trust Deed. (Findings of Fact No. 3, Record at 
1484.) 
4. In December, 1986, the Commissioner of the 
Department of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah 
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commenced a proceeding under Title 7, Chapter 2 of the Utah 
Code, and took possession of Copper State. Thereafter Grant 
Thornton was appointed receiver/liquidator of Copper State. 
5. The Wrights defaulted on their obligations to 
Brighton Bank and Copper State and on or about May 30, 198 6, 
Brighton Bank served on the Wrights and recorded a Notice of 
Default in preparation for a non-judicial foreclosure of the 
Property under the Brighton Trust Deed. (Findings of Fact 
No. 4, Record at 1484.) 
6. On or about September 26, 1986, in response to 
Brighton Bank's foreclosure of the Property, the Wrights 
filed their petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code. (Findings of Fact No. 5, Record at 
1484.) 
7. By Order dated September 7, 1987, Brighton Bank 
obtained relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 
3 62 in the Wrightfs bankruptcy proceeding to permit it to 
proceed with its non-judicial foreclosure under the Brighton 
Trust Deed. (Findings of Fact No. 6, Record at 1484.) 
8. On or about September 22, 1987, the Bankruptcy Court 
granted relief from the Automatic Stay in Wrights1 bankruptcy 
proceeding to permit Copper State to proceed with its 
foreclosure of the Property under the Copper State Trust 
Deed. (Findings of Fact No. 7, Record at 1485.) 
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9. On November 18, 1987, Copper State served on the 
Wrights and recorded in the office of the recorder of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, as part of its non-judicial 
foreclosure of the Property, a Notice of Default. (Findings 
of Fact No. 8, Record at 1485.) 
10. The fair market value of the Property is Three 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) as established by 
Brighton Bank's appraisal dated June 11, 1987. (Findings of 
Fact No. 9, Record at 1485.) 
11. As of February, 1988, Wright owed Brighton Bank 
approximately $235,000 and Copper State approximately 
$47,000. Together, the claims of Brighton Bank and Copper 
State against the Property total approximately $282,000. 
(Findings of Fact No. 10, Record at 1485.) 
12. The Property is declining in value because of its 
age, its lack of occupancy, a general decline in the real 
estate market, and other factors. (Findings of Fact No. 11, 
Record at 1485.) 
13. The value of the Property is being consumed by 
ongoing interest accruing on the obligations of Copper State 
and Brighton Bank, and by other claims against the Property. 
(Findings of Fact No. 12, Record at 1485.) 
14. There is no evidence that would suggest that 
interest will not continue to accrue and continue to erode 
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the "equity cushion." (Findings of Fact No. 13, Record at 
1486.) 
15. Considering only the claims of Brighton Bank and 
Copper State, which together total $282,000.00, and the value 
of the Property at $300,000.00, there is only an $18,000.00 
"equity cushion". (Findings of Fact No. 14, Record at 1486.) 
16. This $18,000.00 cushion will probably be more than 
absorbed by known but unascertained costs, attorney's fees 
and other claims. (Findings of Fact No. 15, Record at 1486.) 
17. On or about December 3, 1987, Brighton Bank filed a 
Motion for Relief from Stay of Proceedings under Utah Code 
Ann., Section 7-2-7, (1987), which motion came on for hearing 
on December 18, 1987, before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Third Judicial District Court Judge. (Record at 1037-1083.) 
18. After considering oral arguments and memoranda 
submitted by both Copper State and Brighton Bank, Judge 
Moffat filed his Minute Entry on January 27, 1988, and on 
March 8, 1988, the court issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Order Modifying Stay of Section 
7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated (1987), allowing Brighton Bank 
to proceed with its non-judicial foreclosure of the Property 
under the Brighton Trust Deed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in finding as a matter of fact 
that the "equity cushion" protecting the Brighton Trust Deed 
was only $18,000. Because Brighton Bank's lien is senior to 
all other liens, the value of the Property available to 
protect the Brighton Trust Deed is the difference between the 
amount due under the Brighton Note ($235,000) and the value 
of the Property ($300,000). Therefore, there is a $65,000.00 
equity cushion in the Property to protect Brighton Bank. 
The $65,000 equity cushion is sufficient to protect 
Brighton Bank's lien in the Property, including accruing 
interest and costs, for at least the next two (2) years. 
While the existence of junior liens impacts on the net equity 
of the Property, such liens can in no way impair or impinge 
upon the increasing value of Brighton Bank's senior lien. 
Brighton Bank would not be financially damaged by imposition 
of the Section 7-2-7 stay and would eventually realize the 
full benefit of its bargained-for senior lien interest. 
The statements of the Utah Legislature and the express 
statutory purpose and intent of Title 7, Chapter 2 of the 
Utah Code, evidences a clear legislative intent to protect 
depositors of failed financial institutions, and Section 
7-2-7 was enacted to preserve the assets of a failed 
institution for the benefit of its depositors. The lower 
court failed to recognize the special protections to be 
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afforded such depositors, thus emasculating the provisions of 
Title 7, Chapter 2 and specifically Section 7-2-7. 
By granting the motion for relief from stay, Brighton 
Bank is now free to proceed with its foreclosure action which 
will ultimately result in the extinguishment of Copper 
State's junior lien interest. As a result, the depositors of 
Copper State will be denied a valuable asset that would 
otherwise be available to help satisfy their claims. In the 
absence of injury to Brighton Bank and in light of the 
Property's significant value, the interests of Brighton Bank 
and Copper State's depositors can be fully realized through a 
reinstatement of the Section 7-2-7 stay. 
The stay of Section 7-2-7 is based almost verbatim on 
the language of 11 U.S.C. Section 3 62, the automatic stay 
provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Other 
sections of Title 7, Chapter 2 are likewise based on 
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In view of Section 
7-2-7's obvious nexus with the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and in 
the absence of controlling state law, federal bankruptcy law, 
as a sophisticated and complete body of law dealing with the 
liquidation and distribution of an insolvement entity's 
assets, is of assistance in interpreting and applying the 
Section 7-2-7 stay. Federal bankruptcy law requires in 
granting relief from the stay that the interests of secured 
creditors be balanced against the interest of other creditors 
9 
who will benefit from an enforcement of the stay. In this 
case, Brighton Bank would not be financially damaged as a 
result of the stay and the depositors of Copper State would 
be denied the benefit of a valuable asset if the stay were 
not enforced. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT BRIGHTON BANK'S 
"EQUITY CUSHION11 IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VALUE 
OF BRIGHTON BANK'S LIEN PLUS COPPER STATE'S JUNIOR LIEN 
AND THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
On December 18, 1987, Brighton Bank's Motion for Relief 
From Stay of Proceeding Under Utah Code Ann., Section 1-2-1, 
(1987) came on for hearing in the lower court. The hearing 
was not reported and no transcript of the hearing is 
available. By its motion, Brighton Bank requested relief 
from the automatic stay imposed by Utah Code Ann., Section 
1-2-1 (1987)(hereinafter "Section 7-2-7") in order to proceed 
under the Brighton Trust Deed with a non-judicial foreclosure 
of the Property, which was also encumbered by Copper State's 
junior lien interest represented by the Copper State Trust 
Deed. As more particularly described in the Statement of 
Facts above, Copper State is currently in receivership and 
liquidation proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections 
7-2-1 et seq. (1987). 
In support of its motion, Brighton Bank argued, inter 
alia, that since Brighton Bank had a lien interest in the 
Property superior to the lien of the Copper State Trust Deed, 
either Brighton Bank should be permitted to foreclose the 
Brighton Trust Deed or, in the alternative, Copper State 
should be required to make monthly payments to Brighton Bank 
11 
pursuant to the terms of the Brighton Note. Brighton Bank 
argued that it "should not be left in limbo for an indefinite 
period of time while its collateral continue[s] to depreciate 
in value." (See Reply Memorandum of Brighton Bank, page 6; 
Record at 1172). 
In opposition to Brighton Bank's motion, Grant Thornton 
argued that the stay of Section 7-2-7 was intended to enjoin 
all actions affecting the Property in order to give Grant 
Thornton sufficient time to sell the Property at its fair 
market value and to prevent the expenditure of Copper State's 
meager assets to protect it's junior lien interest. Grant 
Thornton asserted that Brighton Bank would not be harmed by a 
continuation of the stay because Brighton Bank's equity 
cushion in the Property was more than adequate to cover the 
accruing interest and costs on the Brighton Note. On the 
other hand, if Brighton Bank was granted relief from the 
automatic stay of Section 7-2-7, Grant Thornton would be 
forced to pay the Brighton Note of approximately $2 35,000, or 
Copper State's junior lien interest of approximately $47,000 
would be eliminated as a result of Brighton Bank's 
foreclosure sale, thus denying Copper State's depositors the 
benefit of Copper State's interest in the Property. Such an 
inequitable result, Grant Thornton argued, is not what the 
Utah Legislature intended in enacting Section 7-2-7 to effect 
a stay of proceedings against property of a failed depository 
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institution such as Copper State. (See Memorandum In 
Opposition To Motion For Relief From Stay, page 9; Record at 
1118.) 
The lower court rejected Grant Thornton's arguments and 
granted Brighton Bank's motion to lift the stay of Section 
7-2-7. On March 8, 1988, the lower court made its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and entered its final Order 
Modifying Stay of Section 7-2-7(1), Utah Code Ann. In that 
Order, the court found as follows: 
Considering only the claims of Brighton Bank and Copper 
State, which together total $282,000.00, and the value 
of the Property at $300,000.00, there is only an 
$18,000.00 "equity cushion". 
(Findings of Fact No. 14; Record at 1486.) 
The lower court further determined that this $18,000.00 
"equity cushion" was all that protected Brighton Bank's 
interest in the Property. The lower court also found that 
"[t]his $18,000.00 cushion will probably be more than 
absorbed by known but unascertained costs, attorney's fees, 
and other claims." (Findings of Fact No. 15, Record at 
1486.) 
Ordinarily, a lower court's finding of fact should not 
be disturbed if it is based on substantial and competent 
evidence. Smith v. Utah Central Credit Union, 727 P.2d 219, 
220 (Utah 1986). In the present case, however, it is not a 
matter of whether there are facts which could be strung 
together to construct the challenged finding, but whether 
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sound reasoning, in light of commonly understood principles, 
supports the lower court's finding. The evidence as to the 
amounts owed Copper State and Brighton Bank and the value of 
the Property is not in dispute. At issue here is the 
definition of "equity cushion" as it applies to Brighton 
Bank's lien interest in the Property. It appears that the 
lower court arrived at its determination of equity cushion by 
subtracting the total indebtedness to Copper State and 
Brighton Bank ($282,000.00) from the value of the Property 
($300,000.00). Such an approach presupposes that Copper 
State's junior lien somehow impacts upon or decreases either 
the value of Brighton Bank's lien or the amount of equity in 
the Property protecting Brighton Bank's lien. Neither 
supposition, however, is true. 
Well-reasoned decisions from other courts would define 
Brighton Bank's equity cushion in the Property as the 
difference between the amount owed Brighton Bank under the 
Brighton Note and Brighton Trust Deed and the fair market 
value of the Property. Such a definition of an equity 
cushion and the protection it affords senior lienholders is 
described in a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. In the case of In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th 
Cir. 1984) the holder of a first trust deed in the amount of 
$66,700.00 sought relief from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. 
Section 3 62 as to property having a fair market value of 
14 
$105,000.00. The lower courts found that because the 
property at issue was encumbered by other junior liens in 
excess of the value of the property, the interest of the 
first trust deed holder was not being protected and relief 
from the stay was appropriate. In reversing the decision of 
the lower courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the first lienholder was adequately protected from the 
stay through the existence of a $38,300.00 equity cushion 
(the difference between the first lien of $66,700.00 and the 
$105,000.00 market value of the property). In making its 
ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court clarified the distinction 
between equity and equity cushion: 
"Equity cushion" has been defined as the value of the 
property, above the amount owed to the creditor with a 
secured claim, that will shield that interest from loss 
due to any decrease in the value of the property during 
the time the automatic stay remains in effect. 
"Equity," as opposed to "equity cushion", is the value, 
above all secured claims against the property, that can 
be realized from the sale of the property for the 
benefit of the unsecured creditors. 
Id. at 1400 n.2 (citations omitted). 
In other words, the amount of an equity cushion is calculated 
by taking the difference between the amount of the lien at 
issue, together with all other senior liens, and the fair 
market value of the property securing such liens. 
Turning to the facts of this case, the lower court 
found, based on the stipulation of the parties, that the 
value of the Property was $300,000.00. (Findings of Fact No. 
15 
9, Record at 1485.) The lower court additionally found that 
Brighton Bank was owed $235,000.00 under the Brighton Note. 
(Findings of Fact No. 11, Record at 1485.) The lower court 
made no finding regarding the existence of any liens superior 
to the Brighton Trust Deed. Therefore, Brighton Bank's 
equity cushion in the Property is the difference between 
Brighton Bank's senior lien ($235,000.00) and the appraised 
fair market value of the Property ($3 00,000.00) or 
$65,000.00. Accordingly, the interest of Brighton Bank in 
the Property is protected by a $65,000.00 equity cushion 
rather than an $18,000.00 equity cushion as found by the 
lower court. 
II. 
THE EXISTENCE OF A $65,000.00 EQUITY CUSHION IS 
SUFFICIENT TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT BRIGHTON BANKfS LIEN 
INTEREST AND A REINSTATEMENT OF THE SECTION 7-2-7 STAY 
WILL NOT DEPRIVE BRIGHTON BANK OF THE VALUE 
FOR WHICH IT BARGAINED. 
Having established that the Brighton Trust Deed is 
protected by a $65,000.00 equity cushion, Grant Thornton 
asserts that the existence of this equity cushion is 
sufficient to adequately protect Brighton Bank's lien for a 
substantial period of time and that a reinstatement of the 
Section 7-2-7 stay will not financially harm Brighton Bank 
nor deprive Brighton Bank of the value of its bargain. 
It is beyond question that under Utah law the interest 
of a senior lienholder takes precedence over and, indeed, may 
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even impinge upon the interests of junior lienholders. See, 
Utah Code Ann, Sections 57-3-2, 57-1-29, 78-37-4 (1953); 
State v, Johnson, 268 P. 561 (Utah 1928) ; and Utah Farm Prod, 
Credit v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987). Thus, the 
existence of junior liens upon the Property, including the 
Copper State Trust Deed, can in no way impinge upon or impair 
Brighton Bank's $65,000.00 equity cushion. Because of these 
facts, the reinstatement of the stay of Section 7-2-7 will 
not result in any financial injury to Brighton Bank. 
The existence of the $65,000.00 equity cushion allows 
the obligation represented by the Brighton Note to increase 
in value through the continual accrual of interest, costs, 
attorney fees and such other amounts as provided for therein. 
As a result, Brighton Bank is entitled to eventually receive 
every penny it would otherwise receive if monthly payments 
were presently made on the Brighton Note or if the Brighton 
Note were paid in full. While the Section 7-2-7 stay clearly 
precludes Brighton Bank from exercising its foreclosure 
remedies under the Brighton Trust Deed, the equity cushion 
fully protects the value of Brighton Bank's lien, including 
accruing interest and costs. Thus, Brighton Bank will 
eventually realize the full benefit of its bargain. 
In contrast, the lower court concluded as a basis for 
its ruling that "the value of the property is being consumed 
by the ongoing interest charges of all the security holders, 
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but in primary part by that of Brighton Bank." (Minute 
Entry, page 1; Record at 1302.) In actuality, the interest 
accruing under the Brighton Note is accruing at the rate of 
approximately $1,780.00 per month. Accordingly, it will take 
well over two (2) years before accruing interest will deplete 
Brighton Bank's equity cushion, even taking into account some 
$2 0,000.00 in presently accrued costs and attorney's fees. 
Grant Thornton asserts that if the Section 7-2-7 stay is 
reinstated, it will take substantially less time for Grant 
Thornton to market and sell the Property and pay Brighton 
Bank's lien in full. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF SECTION 7-2-7 IN THAT THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY INTENDED TO GRANT SPECIAL 
PROTECTION TO THE DEPOSITORS OF A FAILED 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION. 
In opposition to Brighton Bank's motion for relief from 
stay, Grant Thornton argued before the lower court that the 
stay should remain in effect in order to facilitate the 
orderly liquidation of Copper State's assets so as to 
maximize the return to depositors, and that the stay of 
Section 7-2-7 was enacted for the primary purpose of 
protecting the assets of a failed depository institution for 
the benefit of its depositors. (See Memorandum In Opposition 
to Motion For Relief From Stay, page 6, Record at 1115.) 
However, in its Minute Entry dated January 27, 1988, the 
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lower court was more persuaded by "the historical concerns of 
priority [that] would indicate that Brighton Bank's rights 
should not be interfered with by a junior lein-holder [sic] 
even if that lein-holder [sic] is in a position of having 
come under the protection of a proceeding by the Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions." (Minute Entry, pages 2-3, Record 
at 1303-4.) 
On March 8, 1988, Grant Thornton brought before the 
lower court, inter alia, its Motion for Execution and Entry 
of Proposed Order, which order was the final Order Modifying 
Stay of Section 7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated, and from which 
Grant Thornton appeals. That hearing was reported and the 
resulting transcript makes available for this Court's review 
further arguments by the parties relative to the application 
of Section 7-2-7 as well as additional statements of the 
lower court that will assist this Court in more fully 
understanding the lower court's perspective of the appliciton 
of Section 7-2-7. 
In response to Grant Thornton's argument that Section 
7-2-7 was intended to afford depositors special protection, 
the lower court stated: 
What you are dealing with are simply stockholders in a 
failed corporation, a for-profit corporation, and while 
I have sympathy with those people, I don't think I have 
the right, and I don't think their rights should be any 
better than anyone else's rights. 
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(Transcript of Hearing on Grant Thornton's Motion for 
Execution and Entry of Proposed Order, March 8, 1988 
[hereinafter "Transcript"], page 40, Record at 1802.) 
The court further stated: 
I donft think that the Legislature has said to the Court 
that we've got to protect the interests of the 
stockholders in these failed thrifts at the cost of the 
stockholders or other creditors in other institutions 
whose legal position was primary to start with. I just 
don't think that's what the statute says. I don't think 
the Legislature intended to give special rights to the 
shareholders in the Thrifts, and I think in this case 
that's all I'm saying. Frankly, I don't think 
equitably, it's fair; if they did, I think it's very 
infair [sic]. 
(Transcript, pages 32-33.) 
In addition, the court opined: 
I am just not of the view that simply because you have a 
receiver for a bunch of people who had money in a 
financial institution, that that financial institution's 
agreement should, all of the sudden, become not binding 
upon its receiver, and that steps into a better position 
than anyone else would be if it were not in the hands of 
receiver. I can't see the logical reason, the rightness 
of it, nor the equity in allowing that to occur, simply 
because the financial institution has failed and has 
been taken over by a receiver; and yet, that's what you 
would have urged me to do, which I denied. 
(Transcript, page 18.) 
In view of the above statements, it is clear that the 
lower court viewed the rights and interests of depositors in 
a failed financial institution to be no greater than those of 
a common shareholder or creditor of a failed private 
corporation. Thus, the lower court concluded that depositors 
of a failed financial institution are not entitled to any 
special consideration or protection. 
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However, the express provisions of Title 7 of the Utah 
Code make it clear that the legislature indeed intended to 
provide special protections to the depositors of a failed 
financial institution and to empower the receiver of a failed 
institution with the necessary statutory tools to maximize 
the return to depositors through the orderly liquidation of 
the failed institution's assets. The legislative findings 
and intent regarding the enactment of Title 7 are set forth 
in Section 7-1-102, which states, in relevant part: 
Accordingly, it is the further purpose of this title to 
grant powers, privileges, and immunities to state 
chartered institutions at least equal to those possessed 
by federally chartered or insured institutions of the 
same class furnishing financial services to the people 
of this State in order to promote competitive equality 
in the financial services industry in this State to 
protect the interests of shareholders, members, 
depositors, and other customers of state chartered 
institutions. 
(b) The legislature further finds that the 
Commissioner of Financial Institution . . . has 
recommended, in order to protect the depositors, 
customers, and shareholders of depository institutions 
. . ., that the Department of Financial Institutions be 
empowered to regulate the establishment in this State 
. . . and to restrict and regulate the acquisition of 
the assets or control of depository institutions doing 
business in this State. 
(c) The Legislature further finds that the 
interest of the public will be served by especially 
authorizing the acquisition of control of, the merger or 
consolidation with, the acquisition of all or a portion 
of the assets of, or the assumption of all or a portion 
of the deposit and other liabilities of a failing or 
failed Utah depository institution . . . approved by the 
Commissioner or any receiver or liquidator appointed by 
him. 
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(d) It is> the intent of the Legislature that the 
provisions of this title be interpreted and implemented 
to promote those purposes, (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, Title 7 was enacted with the specific and express 
purpose of protecting depositors of state-chartered financial 
institutions. 
In regard to the powers and duties of the Commissioner 
of Financial Institutions, Section 7-1-301 states, in 
relevant part: 
In addition to the powers, duties and responsibilities 
specified in this title, the Commissioner has all the 
functions, powers and duties, and responsibilities which 
respect to institutions, persons or businesses subject 
to the jurisdiction of the department contained within 
this article. The Commissioner may adopt and issue 
rules consistent with the purposes and provisions of 
this title . . . [which are]: 
(4) To safeguard the interest of shareholders, 
members, depositors, and other customers of institutions 
and other persons subject to the jurisdiction of the 
department; (Emphasis added.) 
Subseguent to the Commissioner's takeover of the various 
failed thrifts in 1986, the Utah Legislature, in special 
session, enacted U.C.A. 7-20-1 entitled "Thrift Institutions 
in Possession of Commissioner" and in connection therewith 
amended a number of provisions to Title 7. Section 7-20-1 
states the legislative findings and declarations: 
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that: 
(a) The economic well-being of the citizens 
and communities of the state of Utah depends on the 
stability and reliability of the financial institutions 
in the state; 
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(b) Thrift institutions currently in the 
possession of the commissioner are inadequately 
capitalized to fully protect their depositors' funds; 
(c) The industrial loan guaranty corporation 
is in the possession of the commissioner and is 
inadequately funded to insure the deposits in member 
thrift institutions; 
(d) The public trust in financial 
institutions generally would be undermined if the 
commissioner were unable to maximize the return of 
depositors from funds in the thrift institutions in the 
possession of the commissioner; and 
(e) Commerce in the state of Utah would be 
adversely affected by the insolvencies of individual 
depositors that may result from their inability to 
maximize the return of their deposits from the thrift 
institutions in the possession of the commissioner. 
(2) It is, therefore, the purpose of this act to 
facilitate the reorganization, liquidation, or 
disposition of the assets of the thrift institutions in 
possession of the commissioner _in order to maximize the 
return of funds to depositors. (Emphasis added.) 
The above statutory language expresses the clear 
legislative intent to provide special protections to the 
depositors of a failed financial institution, to preserve 
assets of a failed financial institution for the benefit of 
depositors, and to provide for the orderly and timely 
liquidation of such assets in furtherance of the prime 
directive to maximize the return of funds to depositors. 
It is equally evident from the legislative history to 
Chapter 2 of Title 7 that this legislation seeks first and 
foremost to protect depositors. During the 198 3 legislative 
session, the Utah Legislature made substantial amendments to 
Title 7, including the enactment of the stay of Section 
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7-2-7. Recorded statements from the Senate Floor Debate make 
it clear that the amendments to Title 7 were made in order to 
strengthen the Commissioner's ability to deal with 
financially-troubled institutions and to increase the rights 
of depositors. In the introductory remarks regarding the 
proposed amendments to Title 7, Senator Karl Snowr made the 
following comments: 
It is particularly important in my view that the 
Department and the Commissioner particularly be 
empowered to take supervisory action to protect 
depositors and other creditors of troubled financial 
institutions. . . . Now, if I could emphasize and point 
out to the members of the Body that under current 
statutes depositors are treated as unsecured creditors 
entitled to absolutely no preferences or priority over 
any other creditor. Now I think all of you would agree 
with me that this is not sound public policy to allow 
depositors to assume a risk that they are no equipped to 
assess independently. If the public is to have 
confidence in the soundness and safety of Utah's 
financial institutions, depositors must, in my view, be 
given priority over other creditors. The current law 
provides that the only remedy available to the 
Commissioner is a take-over of problem institutions, and 
again I emphasize that depositors have no priority of 
position. The supervisory powers or responsibilities of 
the Commissioner must be expanded and of course that is 
the intent of this legislation, to prevent losses to the 
public in any takeover. . . . This bill seeks first and 
foremost to protect depositors. 
(Senate Floor Debate on Senate Bill 238 of The Financial 
Institution's Act Amendment, February 28, 1983 (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter "Senate Floor Debate"][Statement of 
Senator Karl Snow].) 
Elaine Weiss, then the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions, stated the following regarding the need for 
enacting Senate Bill 238: 
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I think another needed change was to give depositors 
priority. We found out in the very first thrift case 
that depositors were treated as unsecured creditors. I 
don't feel this is sound public policy and after 
discussing with a number of the legislators, it was my 
opinion that it was not the legislative intent. What we 
have done is to give the depositors priority so even in 
a possession case depositors can have access to at least 
part of his funds. The hardship that was worked on the 
public, the depositors of the very first thrift case, 
was very great and should there be another situation 
where the State is forced to take possession, we do not 
think that the depositors should be the victims, the 
depositors should pay the price, and they paid the price 
in Murray. 
Representative Jepson added: 
I would surely support this bill. . . . It will protect 
the consumer and their banking deposits also relating to 
checking accounts, putting them in line of assets, 
distribution of assets, and they would be a preference 
depositor. 
Representative Hillyard also made the following comment 
regarding the priority to be given depositors: 
For example, this bill would give the depositor the 
first lien on those assets. Now it's not the case. And 
you know, the State of Utah is one of the principal 
depositors in our local institutions. If our doors were 
to go bankruptcy [sic] or into receivership without some 
change in the law, we would be an unsecured creditors 
for whatever may be left of the assets. . . . 
Finally, in mustering support for the passage of Senate 
Bill 238, Representative Hillyard summarized the bill as 
follows: 
I urge your support for this Senate bill. I realize 
it's a complicated piece of legislation and it has been 
in an area that is very complicated for many people to 
understand . . . it is one that is designated to give 
the Commissioner greater power to implement the 
authority intent of Senate Bill 138 [Financial 
Institutions Act of 1981] and it is one that is the best 
for the interest of the State of Utah for all people who 
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have deposits in our financial institutions to give them 
the protection they really need . . . 
When read in light of the legislative findings, intent 
and history, it becomes clear that Title 7, Chapter 2 was 
enacted to both provide depositors with greater protections 
than those afforded ordinary creditors and to maximize the 
return from the liquidation of a failed financial 
institution's assets. In order to effectuate these goals, 
the Utah Legislature enacted the stay of Section 7-2-7 to 
preserve all assets of a failed institution for the benefit 
of depositors by precluding third-party creditors from 
dissipating such assets. Accordingly, Grant Thornton 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower 
court's Order Modifying Stay of Utah Code Ann., Section 
7-2-71) (1987) and reinstate the automatic stay of Section 
7-2-7 in order to promote the intent of the legislature by 
protecting the assets of Copper State for the ultimate 
benefit of its depositors. 
IV. 
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT TO GRANT 
BRIGHTON BANK'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
THE SECTION 7-2-7 STAY WILL INJURE 
COPPER STATE'S DEPOSITORS. 
Prior to Brighton Bank's motion for relief, Grant 
Thornton had commenced to market the Property through a real 
estate agent and multiple listing service. With the benefit 
of the stay of Section 7-2-7, Grant Thornton had the 
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opportunity to market the Property within a commercially 
reasonable amount of time and thus maximize the ultimate sale 
price of the Property. The stay also precluded Brighton Bank 
from forcing Grant Thornton to use Copper State's meager cash 
assets to make monthly payments under the Brighton Note. 
Once the Property was sold, Grant Thornton would pay Brighton 
Bank in full and retain Copper State's share of the sale 
proceeds for later distribution to depositors. Such a 
disposal of the Property under the aegis of the Section 7-2-7 
stay insured that Brighton Bank would not lose the benefit of 
its bargain at the time of the sale (Brighton Bank would 
recover the unpaid principal balance due under the Brighton 
Note together with all accrued interest and costs) and the 
depositors of Copper State could reap the benefit of one of 
the few viable assets belonging to the thrift. 
As a result of the lower court's order granting relief 
from the stay, the optimum outcome as explained above is no 
longer possible and Grant Thornton is faced with only two 
unacceptable scenarios. First, Grant Thornton can expend 
cash assets of Copper State to buy or pay-off the Brighton 
Note. In other words, Grant Thornton can spend $235,000.00 
of Copper State's meager assets to protect its $47,000.00 
junior interest. If this were an isolated case, this may be 
an acceptable alternative. However, given the fact that a 
significant portion of Copper State's assets consist of 
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junior lien interests, Grant Thornton believes that this 
could become a financially impossible option. Second, Grant 
Thornton can allow Brighton Bank to proceed with its 
foreclosure of the Property under the Brighton Trust Deed in 
hopes of a bid in excess of the amount owed Brighton Bank. 
As a practical matter, excess proceeds are unlikely for 
at least the following reasons: (1) interested purchasers 
almost never pay fair market value for a property at a 
trustee's deed sale; (2) Brighton Bank's interests are 
parochial in that it has no motivation to maximize the sales 
price of the Property; and (3) the nature of the Property is 
such that it is unlikely that active bidding will be made on 
the Property. The most likely outcome is that Brighton Bank 
will purchase the Property at trustee's sale through a credit 
bid of its lien. This will extinguish Copper State's junior 
lien interest and result in no return to depositors. 
Grant Thornton asserts that the Utah Legislature 
specifically intended to preclude the occurrence of either 
scenario described above through the enactment of Section 
7-2-7, and that Grant Thornton's marketing of the Property 
within a commercially reasonable time is in complete harmony 
with the overall purpose and intent of Title 1, Chapter 2. 
By reversing the lower court and reinacting the Section 7-2-7 
stay, this Court will protect the interests of all Copper 
State's depositors and cause no injury to Brighton E*ank. The 
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equity cushion protects Brighton Bank when Grant Thornton 
sells the Property. 
Even if Grant Thornton cannot sell the Property for its 
current value of $300,000.00 or if interest under the 
Brighton Note continues to erode the equity cushion, every 
dollar above Brighton Bank's lien that can be realized from 
Grant Thornton's sale of the Property will be one more dollar 
for the benefit of Copper State's depositors; whereas, based 
on the decision of the lower court, the depositors now will 
realize nothing from Copper State's lien on the Property. 
V. 
CONTRARY TO THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
SECTION 7-2-7 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AND APPLIED 
IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW. 
In opposition to Brighton Bank's motion for relief, 
Grant Thornton argued that in the absence of Utah Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the provisions of Title 7, 
Chapter 2, the lower court should look to bankruptcy court 
decisions interpreting the analogous automatic stay provision 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (See Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion For Relief From Stay of Proceedings, 
pages 5-10; Record at 1114-20.) Grant Thornton argued that 
reliance upon bankruptcy law is appropriate since the most 
well-developed body of law concerning the protection and 
liquidation of assets is found in the decisions of federal 
bankruptcy courts. Grant Thornton also noted that the 
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language of Section 7-2-7 is virtually identical to the 
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. Section 
3 62. Grant Thornton reasoned that the Utah Legislature 
adopted language from the Bankruptcy Code with the intent of 
providing depositors with the same protections afforded 
creditors in a bankruptcy case; namely, the preservation of 
assets for the benefit of depositors. In addition, Grant 
Thornton also asserts that the logic and policy arguments 
behind federal bankruptcy law supports Grant Thornton's prior 
arguments that (1) Brighton Bank's lien is protected by a 
$65,000.00 equity cushion; (2) Brighton Bank was not and will 
not be financially damaged as a result of the stay; and (3) 
the termination of the stay was not in the best interests of 
Copper State's depositors, and, indeed, will result in an 
injury to such depositors. 
In ruling against Grant Thornton, the lower court 
determined that: 
The Utah Legislature, in enacting the provisions of 
Title 7, Chapter 2, did not intend to adopt federal 
bankruptcy law, nor the cases thereunder, as governing 
law for the courts of the State of Utah. 
(Conclusions of Law No. 1, Record at 1486.) 
The court additionally ruled thcit: 
The apparent minority rule, adopted by the Bankruptcy 
Court for the State of Utah, which would allow a junior 
lienholder under the protection of a proceeding by the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions to interfere with 
a prior lienholder's immediate rights to seek 
foreclosure, should not govern herein. 
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(Conclusions of Law No. 2, Record at 1486.) 
In the hearing on March 8, 1988, the court went so far as to 
state: 
. . . [Y]oufve got to convince me that the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah is going to say that what I think 
to be a minority rule in the bankruptcy area, as adopted 
by the Utah Bankruptcy Court, and frankly, a rule, which 
in part I think turns on what I regard to be a very 
flawed piece of Federal law, that's the whole Bankruptcy 
Act, should become the law of this State in relation to 
these issues. 
(Transcript, page 18.) 
While Grant Thornton cannot cite, for the benefit of the 
Court, express references to bankruptcy law in the 
legislative history to Section 7-2-7, Grant Thornton 
nonetheless urges this Court to interpret and apply Section 
1-2-1 in a manner consistent with federal decisions 
interpreting the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
1. The Utah Legislature Patterned Many Of The Sections 
Of Title 7 Chapter 2, Including Section 1-2-1, 
After Provisions Contained In The United States 
Bankruptcy Code. 
The clearest example of the Utah Legislature's adoption 
of statutory language from the United States Bankruptcy Code 
is found in Section 7-2-7(1), which is taken almost verbatim 
from 11 U.S.C., Section 362(a), the automatic stay provision 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Section 362 states in 
relevant part: 
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(a) Except as provided in subsection b of this section, 
a petition filed under . . . this title . . . operates 
as a stay . . .of — 
(1) The commencement of . . ., including the 
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, 
administrative, or other action of proceeding against 
the debtor . . .; 
(2) The enforcement . . . of a judgment obtained 
before the commencement of a case under this title; 
(3) Any act to obtain possession of property of 
the estate or of property from the estate . . .; 
(4) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any 
lien against property of the estate; 
(6) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim 
against the debtor . . .; 
(7) The setoff of any debt owing to the debtor . . 
. against any claim against the debtor. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after 
notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from 
the stay . . . such as by terminating, annulling, 
modifying, or conditioning such stay . . . for cause . . 
In comparison, the statutory language of Section 7-2-7 
is as follows: 
(1) Except as otherwise specified in subsection 
(2), the taking of an institution or other person by the 
Commissioner under this Chapter shall operate cts a stay 
of the commencement or continuation of: 
(a) A judicial, administrative, or other 
proceeding against the institution, including service of 
process; 
(b) Enforcement of any judgment against the 
institution; 
(c) Any act to obtain possession of property of or 
from the institution; 
(d) Any act to create, perfect, or enforce any 
lien against property of the institution; 
(e) Any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim 
against the institution; and 
(f) The setoff of any debt owing to the 
institution against any crime against the institution. 
Upon application and after notice and hearing, the court 
may for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or 
condition the stay. 
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This comparison of Section 7-2-7 to 11 U.S.C. Section 
3 62 evidences a clear intent by the Utah Legislature to 
pattern Section 7-2-7 after the automatic stay provision of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.C. Section 
109(b)(2), a financial institution is not eligible to be a 
debtor under the United States Bankruptcy Code. Section 
7-2-7 therefore provides state-chartered financial 
institutions with similar protection available to other 
insolvent entities under the United States Bankruptcy Code. 
It should be noted that the language of 11 U.S.C., 
Section 362(d) states that the court shall grant relief from 
the stay if good cause exists, while Section 7-2-7 states 
that the court may grant relief from the stay if good cause 
is shown. The granting of full judicial discretion under 
Section 7-2-7 again evidences a clear intent by the Utah 
Legislature to protect assets of a failed financial 
institution for the benefit of depositors by allowing the 
court to determine whether the stay should be terminated, 
annulled, modified, or conditioned, even if good cause does 
exist for granting such relief. 
It must be further noted that 11 U.S.C. Section 3 62(d) 
allows the bankruptcy court to grant relief from the 
automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate 
protection or lack of equity in the property if the property 
is not necessary to the debtor's effective reorganization. 
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In comparison, Section 7-2-7 contains no specific grounds for 
relief. Grant Thornton asserts that the stay of Section 
7-2-7 is a sword to protect the cissets of a failed thrift for 
the benefit of depositors; however, Section 7-2-7 provides no 
shield for creditors, and no specific grounds for relief from 
the stay. Therefore, based on the absence of language 
mandating relief from the stay and in the absence of specific 
grounds constituting good cause for relief from the stay, 
Grant Thornton asserts that the Utah Legislature intended the 
stay of Section 7-2-7 to be weighted in favor of depositors 
by providing an even broader grant of protection than that 
contained in 11 U.S.C. Section 3 62 and that the state court 
may even allow the stay to remain in place where a senior 
lienholder is not adequately protected, where there is no 
equity in the property, and where the property is not 
necessary for a reorganization of the thrift. 
In addition to Section 7-2-7, Chapter 2 is replete with 
provisions which were adopted either directly or by way of 
concept from sections of the Bankrutpcy Code. A comparison 
of similar Bankruptcy Code provisions contained in Chapter 2 
are as follows: 
Title 7, Chapter 2 United States Bankruptcy Code 
Section 7-2-12(4) 11 U.S.C. Section 365(g) 
Section 7-2-12(6)(b) 11 U.S.C. Section 544(a)(3) 
Section 7-2-12(6)(c) 11 U.S.C. Section 544(a)(1) 
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Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
7-2-12(6] 
7-2-12(6] 
7-2-12(6] 
7-2-12(6] 
7-2-12(6] 
7-2-12(6] 
7-2-15(1] 
7-2-15(1] 
7-2-15(1] 
7-2-15(1] 
7-2-18(3] 
7-2-18(4] 
1(d) 
1(e) 
>(f) 
1(f) ( 
1(f) ( 
l(f)( 
I (b) 
1(C) 
)(e) 
1(e) 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
U.S.C. 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
Section 
544(a) 
101(50) 
547(b) 
547(f) 
547(e)(1)(A) 
547(e)(1)(B) 
507(a)(1) 
507(a)(3) 
506(C) 
502(b)(6) 
1141(a) 
Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) 
Based on the substantial incorporation in Title 7, 
Chapter 2 of Bankruptcy Code provisions, it is clear that the 
drafters of Chapter 2 intended to employ the procedures and 
protections of the Bankruptcy Code in dealing with failed 
financial institutions and in maximizing the return to 
depositors through the preservation and ultimate liquidation 
of financial institution assets. Therefore, in the absence 
of other controlling case law, Grant Thornton asserts that 
judicial reference to federal bankruptcy law interpreting the 
substantially similar automatic stay provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code is appropriate in this case. 
2. The Express Legislative Intent Underlying The 
Automatic Stay Provision Of The United States 
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Bankruptcy Code Is Directly Analogous To The Stay 
Of Section 7-2-7. 
The express Legislative purpose in enacting Section 
7-2-7, is directly analogous to the purpose underlying the 
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. Therefore, an 
understanding of the underlying policy of the automatic stay 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code aids in the interpretation 
and application of Section 7-2-7. 
A review of the legislative history to Section 3 62 of 
the United States Bankruptcy Code is helpful in understanding 
the scope and purpose of the stay. 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor 
protections provided by the bankruptcy law. . . . 
The automatic stay also provides creditor 
protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able 
to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's 
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of 
the claims in preference to and to the detriment of 
other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an 
orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors 
are to be treated equally. A race of diligence by 
creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that. . . . 
. . . . 
The purpose of this provision is to prevent 
dismemberment of the estate. Liquidation must proceed 
in an orderly fashion. 
. . . . 
The paragraph in (7) stays setoffs of mutual debts 
and credits between the debtor and creditor. As with 
all other paragraphs of subsection (a), this paragraph 
does not affect the right of creditors. It simply stays 
its enforcement pending an orderly examination of the 
debtor's and creditor's rights. 
(House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-2 (1977); 
Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978).) 
Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and 
control of the bankruptcy court, and since they 
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constitute a fund out of which all creditors are 
entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental unit 
[or other creditor] of a money judgment would give it 
preferential treatment to the detriment of all other 
creditors• 
(House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong,, 1st Sess. 342-3 (1977); 
Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-2 (1978).) 
In addition, one of the most respected commentaries on 
the Bankruptcy Code has made the following statement 
regarding the scope of the stay. 
The stay of Section 3 62 is extremely broad in scope and 
. . . should apply to almost any type of formal or 
informal action against the debtor or the property of 
the estate. It should be observed that one of the 
benefits of the stay is creditor protection in a manner 
consistent with the promotion in the bankruptcy goal of 
equality of distribution. 
Collier on Bankruptcy, paragraph 362.04 at 362-31 (15th ed. 
1988) . 
Based on the above legislative history and comments, the 
purpose of the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code may be 
summarized as follows: (1) To provide the debtor with a 
breathing spell from creditors in order to analyze the extent 
of assets and the validity of claims; (2) to promote an 
equality of distribution of assets among creditors; and (3) 
to promote an orderly administration and, if necesasry, 
liquidation of estate assets. 
Grant Thornton asserts that the only reasonable 
conclusion resulting from the comparison of the policy and 
purpose underlying the automatic stay provision of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the express legislative intent supporting 
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Title 7, Chapter 2 and the language of Section 7-2-7, is that 
the purpose of Section 7-2-7 and 11 U.S.S. Section 362 is 
identical. 
VI. 
IN VIEW OF SECTION 7-2-7'S NEXIS WITH THE UNITED 
STATE'S BANKRUPTCY CODE, IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT IT BE 
INTERPRETED EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY REFERENCE TO 
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY CASE LAW. 
In its argument in opposition to Brighton Bank's motion 
for relief from the stay of Section 7-2-7, Grant Thornton 
argued that federal bankruptcy law, either by direct 
reference or by analogy, should be considered in determining 
the scope of the stay and the grounds for granting relief 
from the stay. 
In its Reply Memorandum, Brighton Bank argued that 
federal bankruptcy law was of minimal precedential value and 
that the absence of enumerated factors justifying cause for 
relief from the Section 7-2-7 evidences an intent by the Utah 
Legislature to provide the state courts with greater 
discretion than that possessed by bankruptcy courts in 
deciding whether good cause exists for granting relief from 
the stay. 
Grant Thornton asserts that reference to federal 
bankruptcy law is appropriate for the following reasons. 
First, the decisions of the federal bankruptcy courts provide 
a complete, sophisticated and carefully reasoned body of law 
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concerning the protection and liquidation of assets of an 
insolvent entity and the maximization of payment to creditors 
of such an entity. Inasmuch as the interpretation and 
application of Section 7-2-7 is an issue of first impression, 
this Court should avail itself of the well-established 
principals, policy and procedures employed by the federal 
bankruptcy courts in interpreting and applying the analagous 
automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 
In addition, Grant Thornton has not taken the position 
that federal bankruptcy law should be controlling in this 
instance but has rather asserted that in the absence of 
controlling state case law, the well-reasoned decisions of 
federal bankruptcy law are helpful in interpreting Section 
7-2-7, especially in light of the similar balancing of 
interests employed in the relief from stay decisions of the 
federal bankruptcy courts. 
Grant Thornton asserts that its application of Section 
7-2-7 is in harmony with current federal bankruptcy law. In 
determining whether relief from stay should be granted, the 
Bankruptcy Code mandates that the court balance the interests 
to be protected — the interest in preserving assets for the 
benefit of all creditors balanced against the right of a 
secured creditor to execute on the collateral securing its 
debt. 
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In balancing these interests, federal bankruptcy law 
employs the concept of "adequate protection" which, in 
essence, requires that while a secured creditor may not be 
able to immediately execute on its lien, adequate protection 
of the lien is required in order to ensure that the secured 
creditor receives the value for which it bargained. As 
stated in Collier: 
The most important message of the Code with respect 
to the treatment of entities with an interest in 
property of the estate is that their remedies may 
be suspended, even abrogated, their right of 
recourse to collateral may be terminated as it is 
consumed in the business, but the value of their 
secured position as it existed at the commencement 
of the case is to be protected throughout the case 
[by means of adequate protection].... 
Collier on Bankruptcy, paragraph 361.01 at 361-7 (15th ed. 
1988) . 
In this case, the secured interest of Brighton Bank is 
being adequately protected through the existence of an equity 
cushion of approximately $65,000.00. Because of this equity 
cushion, Brighton Bank's secured lien continues to increase 
in amount through the accrual of interest, costs, and 
attorneys1 fees. While it is true that the accrual of 
interest under the Brighton Note will eventually erode the 
net equity of the Property and will thereafter begin to erode 
the value of Copper State's lien, it will be a substantial 
period of time before Brighton Bank experiences any damage as 
a result of being stayed from exercising its foreclosure 
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rights under the Brighton Trust Deed. In other words, the 
stay of Section 7-2-7 would impair Brighton Bank's ability to 
exercise its foreclosure remedies; however, Brighton Bank is 
not being financially damaged by the stay because there is 
sufficient equity cushion in the Property to cover its 
accruing interest, costs, or attorneys' fees. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the 
absence of injury to a senior lienholder as a result of the 
automatic stay where there is sufficient value in the 
property to cover accruing interest and costs. In the case 
of In re Mellor, supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held: 
Although the existence of a junior lien may be 
relevant in determining "equity" under section 
362(d)(2), it cannot be considered in determining 
whether the interest of a senior lienholder is 
adequately protected. In re La Jolla Mortgage 
Fund, 18 B.R. at 289. The claim of a junior 
lienholder cannot affect the claim of a holder of a 
perfected senior interest. See In re Wolford 
Enterprises, Inc., 11 B.R. 571, 574 
(B.Ct.S.D.W.Virg. 1981) [rejecting contention that 
defendant lacked equity due to second deed of 
trust; creditor failed to acknowledge that first 
deed has priority and that value of property was 
sufficient to satisfy that lien]; In re Breuer, 4 
B.R. 499 (B.Ct.S.D.N.Y. 1980) [holding there was a 
sufficient equity cushion for creditor holding 
first mortgage despite existence of four junior 
mortgages totalling more than market value of 
property]. Thus, in determining that adequate 
protection was not available . . ., the bankruptcy 
court failed to recognize that the [senior lien] 
interest has priority over [the junior lien] 
interest. It also has priority over all of the 
judgment liens. 
Id. at 1400-01. 
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In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court held that the 
superior lienholder was attempting to acquire property worth 
substantially more than its senior lien: "The purpose of 
adequate protection under section 3 61 is to ensure that the 
secured creditor receives in value essentially what he 
bargained for, not a windfall.11 Id. at 1401 (citation 
omitted). 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah has 
likewise recognized that senior lienholders are not damaged 
by the stay of 11 U.S.C. Section 3 62 where there is 
sufficient collateral to protect their lien. In the case of 
In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803 (Bktcy. Utah 
1981), Judge Mabey ruled that a senior lienholder's request 
for relief from stay was not warranted for the following 
reasons: 
It is a first lien with ample collateral to protect 
Banker's Life. The collateral and therefore the 
lien are not declining or subject to sudden 
depreciation in value. Banker's Life is suffering 
no pain cognizable under section 3 62 as a result of 
the stay, and relief from the stay is therefore, at 
this juncture, unnecessary. 
Id. at 809. 
Judge Mabey further recognized that relief from the stay 
under such circumstances would not be in the best interest of 
creditors: 
Foreclosure and liquidation of the property would 
run counter to [the debtor's reorganization] and 
would deprive debtor and other creditors of its 
going-concern value. If liquidation is allowed, it 
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should occur under the aegis of the Court and in 
the interests of all. Banker's Life is no better 
qualified to handle this liquidation than the 
debtor or the trustee. Indeed, Banker's Life may 
be ill-equipped to undertake this task, both 
because its interests are parochial and because, 
for regulatory or other reasons, it may be a 
reluctant caretaker. 
Id. 
Judge Mabey concluded that the interests of all creditors are 
better served if property is sold in an orderly fashion 
rather than in a forced sale due to the fact that the 
commercial marketing of real property almost always results 
in a higher sale price than if the real property is disposed 
of through a trust deed or foreclosure sale. 
For these reasons, the stay of Section 7-2-7 should 
preclude Brighton Bank from exercising the foreclosure 
remedies under the Brighton Trust Deed because its superior 
lien interest is adequately protected by a significant equity 
cushion to cover continually-accruing interest, costs and 
attorneys' fees. In support of Grant Thornton's argument, 
and in the absence of controlling state case law, Grant 
Thornton has cited federal bankruptcy law which likewise 
recognizes that the interests of all creditors, or in this 
case the interests of depositors, must be weighed against the 
interests of secured creditors; however, where a superior 
lienholder is not being financially damaged as a result of 
the stay of Section 7-2-7, the stay should remain in effect 
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in order to preserve and maximize the value of assets for the 
benefit of depositors. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the express provisions of Title 7, Chapter 2 
as well as its supporting legislative findings and history, 
it is clear that the Utah Legislature intended to provide 
special protections to the depositors of a failed financial 
institution chartered in Utah. Specifically, the Utah 
Legislature intended to preserve the assets of a failed 
institution for the benefit of depositors and to provide for 
the orderly and timely liquidation of such assets in order to 
maximize the return to such depositors. The lower court's 
decision, however, frustrates the purpose of this legislation 
and deprives the depositors of Copper State of the statutory 
protections to which they are entitled. 
Moreover, the competing interests of Brighton Bank as a 
senior lienholder in the Property are not threatened by 
enforcement of the stay under Section 7-2-7 in light of the 
$65,000 equity cushion adequately protecting its interest. 
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For the foregoing reasons, Grant Thornton respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the lower court's Order 
Modifying Stay of Section 7-2-7(1), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this /^ day of June, 1988. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
raig H. Christensen 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION 
BY THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS OF COPPER STATE 
THRIFT Sc LOAN COMPANY 
Case No. C-87-58 
ORDER MODIFYING STAY OF SECTION 7-2-7(1), 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
The Motion for Relief from the Stay of Proceedings filed 
by Brighton Bank came on for hearing before the Honorable 
Richard H. Moffatt on December 18, 1987 at the hour of 9:00 
a.m. Grant Thornton, the Receiver/Liquidator of Copper State 
Thrift Sc Loan was represented by its counsel, Jeffrey M. 
Jones of Allen Nelson Hardy & Evans. Brighton Bank was 
represented by its counsel, Steven H. Gunn of Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker. The Court heard the oral argument of the parties, 
reviewed the memoranda of the parties concerning the motion, 
and took the matter under advisement. As a result of said 
oral arguments and memoranda, the Court filed its Minute 
Entry on January 27, 1988 and now desires to enter its 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order as follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Copper State is the holder of a Promissory Note 
executed by Willis and Afton Wright (hereinafter "Wrights") 
on or about March 29, 1983. This Note was secured by a Deed 
of Trust dated March 29, 1983 describing real property 
located at 2500 Walker Lane, Salt Lake County, Utah 
(hereinafter the "Property"). 
2- On or about September 12, 1983, Wrights executed a 
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed in favor of Brighton Bank for 
the Property. 
3. On or about October 11, 1983, Copper State agreed to 
subordinate the Copper State Deed of Trust to the Deed of 
Trust executed by the Wrights in favor of Brighton Bank. 
4. The Wrights defaulted on their obligations to 
Brighton Bank and Copper State and on or about May 30, 198 6, 
Brighton Bank served on the Wrights and recorded a Notice of 
Default in preparation for a non-judicial foreclosure of the 
Property. 
5. On or about September 26, 1986, in response to 
Brighton Bank's foreclosure of the Property, the Wrights 
filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
6. By Order dated September 7, 1987, Brighton Bank 
obtained relief from the Automatic Stay in the Wright's 
2 
bankruptcy proceeding to permit it to proceed with its 
non-judicial foreclosure. 
7. On or about September 22, 1987, the Bankruptcy Court 
granted relief from the Automatic Stay in Wrights' bankruptcy 
to permit Copper State to proceed with foreclosure on its 
lien on the Property. 
8. On November 18, 1987, Copper State served on the 
Wrights and recorded in the office of the recorder of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, as part of a non-judicial 
foreclosure of the Property, a Notice of Default. 
9. The value of the Property is Three Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($300,000.00) as shown by Brighton Bank's appraisal 
dated June 11, 1987. 
10. Brighton Bank is currently owed approximately Two 
Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($235,000.00) and Copper 
State is owed approximately Forty Seven Thousand 
($47,000.00). Together, the claims of Brighton Bank and 
Copper State total approximately Two Hundred Eighty Two 
Thousand Dollars ($287,000.00). 
11. The Property is declining in value because of its 
age, its lack of occupancy, a general decline in the real 
estate market, and other factors. 
12. The value of the Property is being consumed by 
ongoing interest accruing on the obligations of Copper State 
and Brighton Bank, and by other claims against the Property. 
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13. There is no evidence that would suggest that 
interest will not continue to accrue and continue to erode 
the equity cushion. 
14. Considering only the claims of Brighton Bank and 
Copper State, which together total $282,000.00, and the value 
of the Property at $300,000.00, there is only a $18,000.00 
"equity cushion". 
15. This $18,000.00 cushion will probably be more than 
absorbed by known but unascertained costs, attorney's fees 
and other claims. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Utah Legislature, in enacting the provisions of 
Title 7, Chapter 2, did not intend to adopt federal 
bankruptcy law nor the cases thereunder as governing law for 
the courts of the State of Utah. 
2. The apparent minority rule, adopted by the 
Bankruptcy Court for the State of Utah, which would allow a 
junior lienholder under the protection of a proceeding by the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions to interfere with a 
prior lienholder's immediate rights to seek foreclosure, 
should not govern herein. 
3. Because of the decline in the value of the Property 
and the accruing interest of Brighton Bank, even applying 
federal bankruptcy law, there is sufficient "cause" to allow 
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Brighton Bank to exercise its rights to foreclosure against 
the Property, 
Therefore, having now entered its findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, the Court hereby orders that the stay 
imposed by Section 7-2-7 of the Utah Code Annotated be and is 
hereby lifted so that Brighton Bank and all other lien 
claimants may proceed cjgainct the Property. 
The Court further certifies that this Order is a final 
order under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAIT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE POSSESSION 
BY THF CC^TSSIONER OF FINANCIAL 
INSTTIUTTONS OF COPPER STATE : MINUTE ENTRY 
THRIFT AND IJ3AN COMPANY 
CASE NO. C-87-58 
The Motion for Relief from the Stay of Proceedings filed by Brighton 
Bank having been heard on oral argument and multiple memoranda having been 
submitted and considered, the Court now decides as follows. The Court is of 
the opinion that the Stay as to the action of Brighton Bank, in foreclosing 
its Trust Deed Lain should be lifted. This decision is based upon the fact 
that there is a declining value in the property by reason of its age, its 
not being occupied, and other factors including a general decline in the 
real estate market. That is demonstrated by a comparison of the two 
appraisals heretofore made on the property. In addition, the value of the 
property is being consumed by the ongoing interest charges of all of the 
security holders but in prjjrary part by that of Brighton Bank. Brighton 
Bankfs interest in the property now is in the magnitude of $2:35,000 and 
increasing daily because of the large amount of the principle debt due to 
that institution. The other claims against the property are likewise 
increasing with the passage of time. There is no evidence before the Court 
that situation is likely to end in the near future under the present status 
of affairs. 
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At this point, considering only the claims of Brighton Bank and Copper 
State, the claiins total $282,000 and as against a value of $300,000 that 
only leaves $18,000 for a "cushion." When other known, although not yet 
probably unknown at this time are all added in, the $18,000 above described 
will probably be more than absorbed. Thus, it appears to the Court that the 
interests of equity are served by allowing Brighton Bank to go forward with 
its foreclosure or noji-judicial sale at this time and, if necessary, to 
determine the order of priorities and have this matter resolved. 
While the Court is not unmindful of the position taken by the counsel 
for Copper State, even if the Court were convinced, which it is not, that 
the cases in the federal bankruptcy system should have some governing 
precedence in this state court matter, it would appear that the interests of 
the prior lein-holder, Brighton, are such now by reason of the passage of a 
substantial period* of time with the property in the hands of the liquidator 
that to allow the matter to continue would be to infringe upon a perfectly 
valid prior claim. 
The Court does not feel that the Utah Legislature in enacting the 
provisions of Title 7, Chapter 2 meant to adopt the federal bankruptcy law 
nor the cases thereunder as the governing law tor the purpose of the state 
courts of Utah. Nor does this Court feel that what appears to be of a 
minority rule in the bankruptcy courts as espoused by the bankruptcy of Utah 
should govern herein where the historical concerns of priority would 
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indicate that Brighton Bank's rights should not be interfered with by a 
junior lein-holder even if that lein-holder is in a position of having come 
under the protection of a proceeding by the Commissioner of Financial 
Instutions. The argument that is espoused regarding the creditors not being 
required to expend a substantially larger amount of money to protect a 
smaller interest may make some sense if the assets had more "cushion/1 but 
as noted above that cushion has disappeared in this case-
The Court feels that even using the view of the bankruptcy court the 
time has came to allow Brighton Bank to exercise its interest- To not do so 
would be to allow their interest in the property to be diminished by the 
decrease in the value of the asset and the increased claim for interest by 
Brighton. It's this Court's opinion that not even the bankruptcy courts in 
Utah would allcw that at this point. It is further the Court1 s opinion that 
the approaching point where the above scenario will start to occur to the 
detriment to all of the parties who have claims against the property 
constitute "cause" as required in Section 7-2-7 of the Utah Code. 
It is therefore ordered that the Stay be and is hereby lifted. Brighton 
Bank and all other lein claimants may proceed as against the property. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true and correct, postage prepaid copy of the foregoing 
Minute Decision was sent to the following: 
Steven H. Gunn 
40^ ^33-ciLct ^lilding 
79 South Main Street 
PoO, Box 45385 
Salt lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Jeffrey M. Jones 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
Laura M- Harris 
215 South State, Suite 900 
Salt lake City, UT 84111 
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SECTION362 (11 U.S.C. §362) 
§ 362, Automatic stay. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a peti-
tion filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an applica-
tion filed under section 5(a) (3) of the Securities Investor Protec-
tion Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu-
£Lice or employment of process, of a jud?ci?l. administrative. 
or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or 
could have been commenced before the commencement of the 
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor 
that arose before the commencement of the case under this ti-
tle; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against prop-
erty of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the com-
mencement of the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or 
of property from the estate or to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against 
property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property 
of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose be-
fore the commencement of the case under this title against 
any claim against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding be-
fore the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this 
title, or of an application under section 5(a) (3) of the Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a) (3)), does not 
operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commence-
ment or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding 
against the debtor; 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of 
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not 
nrnnprt.v of the estate: 
(3) under subsection (a^ of this section, of any act to per-
fect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's 
rights and powers are subject to such perfection under sec-
tion 546 (b) of this title or to the extent that such act is accom-
plished within the period provided under section 
547(e)(2)(A) of this title: 
(4) under subsection i*KJO_of t t i s section, of the com-
mencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's po-
lice or regulatory power; 
• V •••: .)• : : -he-. • k:- (r }'~:> of ihkr- •'::;:, of • ' v -v. fo/ce-
ment of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained 
in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce 
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power; 
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a 
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, 
financial institutions, or securities clearing agency of any 
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commod-
ity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title, for-
ward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 
741(7) of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim 
against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in sec-
tion 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as 
defined in section 741(8) of this title, arising out of commod-
ity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts 
against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from 
such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stock-
broker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency to 
margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, 
forward contracts, or securities contracts; 
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a 
repo participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in 
connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the 
setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as 
defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settle-
ment payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title, 
arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, 
or other property held by or due from such repo participant 
to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agree-
ments; 
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commence-
ment of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust in any 
case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the Secre-
tary is insured or was formerly insured under the National 
Housing Act and covers property, or combinations of prop-
erty, consisting of five or more living units; 
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(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to 
the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax defi-
ciency; 
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a 
lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real prop-
erty that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term 
of the lease before the commencement of or during a case 
under this title to obtain possession of such property; or 
[sic ] 
(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the present-
ment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of 
and protesting dishonor of such an instrument; 
(12)* under subsection (a) of this section, after the date 
which is 90 days after the filing of such petition, of the com-
mencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry of fi-
nal judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to 
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and which 
was brought by the Secretary of Transportation under the 
Ship Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (in-
cluding distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a 
preferred ship or fleet mortgage, or a security interest in or 
relating to a vessel or vessel under construction, held by the 
Secretary of Transportation under section 207 or title XI of 
the Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App: U.S.C. 1117 and 
1271 et seq., respectively), or under applicable State law; or 
(13)* under subsection (a) of this section, after the date 
which is 90 days after the filing of such petition, of the com-
mencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry of f i-
• [Ed. Note: Paragraphs (12) and (13) were added to 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) by § 5001 of 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 (1986). Section 
5001(b) of Pub. L. No. 99-509 provides: 
44
 the amendments made by subsection (a) of this section shall apply only to 
petitions filed under section 362 of this title 11, United States Code, which are 
made after August 1,1986.** 
This is inaccurate. "Petitions** are not made under § 362. The proper reference probably 
shoul dbe to * 'requests' * made pursuant to § 362(d).If'4 petitions'' were intended, then the 
reference should be to *4 cases commenced.' * 
Section 5001(a) also provides that its provisions apply only to title 11 cases 
commenced before December 31,1989. 
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nal judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to 
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and which 
was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under the Ship 
Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) (including 
distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred 
ship or fleet mortgage in a vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, 
or other security interest in a fishing facility held by the the 
Secretary of Commerce under section 207 or title XI of the 
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et 
seq, respectively). 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this 
section— 
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under 
subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is 
no longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this 
section continues until the earliest of— 
(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title con-
cerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 
13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a 
hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under 
subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, 
modifying, or conditioning such stay— 
(1) for^ause, including the lack of adequate protection of 
an interest in property of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under 
subsection (a) of this section, if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; 
and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reor-
ganization. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this sec-
tion for relief from the stay of any act against property of the es-
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tate under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated 
with respect to the party in interest making such request, unless 
the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in 
effect pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing 
and determination under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing 
under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or may be 
consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this 
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pend-
ing the conclusion of the final hearing under subsection (d) of 
this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party oppos-
ing relief from such stay will prevail at the conclusion of such fi-
nal hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary 
hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later 
than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing. 
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or with-
out a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided under 
subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irrepara-
ble damage to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest 
will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice 
and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section 
concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of 
this section— 
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of 
proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof 
on all other issues. 
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay 
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including 
costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may 
recover punitive damages. 
Legislative History 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections pro-
vided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from 
his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all fore-
closure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorga-
nization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that 
drove him into bankruptcy. 
